The state was the biggest beneficiary from the collapse of Tannenbaum's R3bn Ponzi scheme.
Ironically, the South African government ended up being the biggest beneficiary from the collapse of Barry Tannenbaum’s multi-billion-rand Ponzi fraud rather than the creditors.
Readers will recall how hundreds of wealthy South Africans were tempted with too-good-to-be-true quick profits to invest large sums – some individuals invested tens of millions of rand – supposedly to be used to fund the importation of the raw materials used to manufacture drugs for the treatment of HIV/Aids.
The documentation was faked and simply served as a cover for a cash pyramid or Ponzi scheme – essentially, an illegal form of gambling. Money invested by later players is used to pay profits to earlier players. Those who enter early stand to make huge profits, the bulk of players who buy in later will probably lose all they invest when the collapses – which it inevitaby must when the scheme can no longer recruit larger and larger numbers of new investors.
Making matters worse for the numerous latecomers to the scheme – which was sold to them as a legitimate, though somewhat miraculous, investment – when it collapsed in 2009, SARS and the National Prosecuting Authority’s (NPA) Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU), between them grabbed over R91 million found in the operators’ bank accounts.
Tannenbaum accomplice Dean Rees
A high court judge placed Tannenbaum’s local estate into provisional liquidation in June 2009, and the order was made final in August of that year. In July 2009, the AFU provisionally froze three accounts held by Darryl Leigh, one of Tannenbaum’s main accomplices.
NPA Gauteng spokesperson Phindile Mjonondwane said that the AFU had subsequently obtained four court orders against Leigh and another Tannenbaum accomplice, Dean Rees, which had garnered a total of R58.4 million.
On August 18, 2010, the AFU obtained the first court order that saw R49.4 million in cash from Leigh’s accounts handed over to the state.
“The money was paid into the Criminal Assets Recovery Accounts (CARA),” Mjonondwane said.
The CARA is a separate account in the National Revenue Fund in which monies and property get deposited following a judicial forfeiture or confiscation order. A Criminal Assets Recovery Committee, which usually consists of state ministers, decides how the CARA money is spent.
On March 31, 2011, the AFU went on to take possession of a Ferrari 599 GTB Fiorano that Rees had bought for R4 million.
The AFU sold the car at public auction for R2.08m and the money was paid to the CARA.
The third court order was handed down on June 12, 2013, and resulted in R30,000 in cash from a Stanlib account that belonged to Leigh, being handed over to the state.
The fourth court order resulted in the AFU’s taking over a property in Camps Bay, Cape Town owned by Leigh. Leigh bought the house in November 2007 for his daughter, Laura Haude.
“The matter went to court but was eventually settled. In terms of the settlement, the property was sold for R13.85m. An amount of R6.95m was excluded from the forfeiture order (giving consideration to the renovations and improvements made by Laura Haude to the property). The balance of the proceeds of the sale, less curator fees, was paid into the CARA,” Mjonondwane said.
Leigh bought the property for R8.8m for Haude and registered it in her name when she was a 25-year-old student. She is now an attorney and a director of Cape Town-based law firm Hofmeyr and Haude Inc.
When Noseweek contacted Haude she confirmed that she was Leigh’s daughter but declined to comment further.
Mjonondwane said that the trustees of Tannenbaum’s insolvent estate litigated against the AFU to have the R49m that was seized from Leigh handed back to them for distribution to investors who had lost out.
“However, the court ruled that the money was the proceeds of criminal activity and as such was tainted and could not be handed over to the insolvent estate… The insolvent estate filed a notice to appeal the judgment but later abandoned it,” she said.
Both the people who set up the scheme and those who contributed to it all committed criminal offences, she added.
The Unfair Business Practices Act declared that the operation of or participation in a multiplication scheme, offering an effective annual interest rate of 20% and more, above the South African Reserve Bank’s repo rate, to any participant was unlawful, Mjonondwane said.
“Therefore, all participants who invested in an unlawful multiplication scheme will have acted unlawfully. Investors who invest in such schemes must be aware that they are at risk of losing their investments, not only by the orchestrators of the scheme but also to law enforcement agencies. It should serve as a further deterrent by the general public not to get involved in such schemes,” she said.
The NPA’s Special Commercial Crimes Unit (SCCU) has to date charged no one criminally nor arrested anyone concerning the Tannenbaum Ponzi scheme, despite the scheme’s having been an obvious fraud, Mjonondwane said.
Tannenbaum fled to Australia in 2007 and his main agent/accomplice, attorney Dean Rees, absconded with his family to Switzerland in early 2009 in a Boeing they had hired for the purpose.
The NPA has never applied for the extradition of either of them back to South Africa, despite Noseweek having reported in November 2009 that “arrests are expected soon”.
“At this stage, no one has been charged, and there has been no extradition process,” Mjonondwane now admits. This is despite the fact that at the second creditors’ meeting of the Tannebaum estate on 16 March 2011, a note prepared ahead of the meeting by the trustees stated: “We have been informed by the NPA that they intend to apply for [Tannenbaum’s] extradition.
“International warrants of arrest for Tannenbaum and Rees were issued but have not to date been executed,” they added.
South Africa has an extradition treaty with Australia but not with Switzerland. In the past, attempts to extradite South Africans from Australia have proven difficult. This is due to an Australian court ruling in December 2004 related to a certain Jacob de Bruyn. Australian Minister of Justice and Customs Christopher Ellison approved De Bruyn’s deportation back to South Africa. But an Australian court ruled against this because the state of South African prisons “would be oppressive or incompatible with humanitarian considerations because there is no certainty that De Bruyn will not contract HIV/Aids if made to serve a sentence in a South African prison”.
De Bruyn was wanted for defrauding First National Bank of R1.2m.
The Tannenbaum Ponzi scheme highlighted the weaknesses in the South African Insolvency Act of 1936, and it was in urgent need of being updated, mainly to allow for cross-border transactions, a source said.
SARS, by law, is a preferential creditor in any liquidation, which places it ahead of concurrent creditors, which in this case would have been mainly people who invested in the scheme, lost out and submitted claims to the trustees of the Tannenbaum insolvent estate.
The estate paid SARS R32.7m.
Lawyers involved with the estate were paid out a total of R33.3m, according to the first liquidation and distribution account.
Other parties to get significant income from the insolvent estate were forensic investigators, who got paid R13.3m, while the trustees’ commission was R9.9m.
After these payments, the balance remaining in the estate for distribution among 105 creditors – who had claims of almost R164m – was R10.8m, according to the first liquidation and distribution account.
Many wealthy people who put money into the scheme lost out. Several submitted claims that were rejected or they were paid out well short of the claimed amount.
The three joint trustees of Tannenbaum’s insolvent estate are Gavin Gainsford, who at the time worked for KPMG and now works at GCW Administrators, Vincent Matsepe of Matsepe Inc and Shirish Kalianjee of Shirish Kalian Attorneys.
Noseweek sent Kalianjee several questions regarding the Tannenbaum estate, but he didn’t respond.
Rees’s local insolvent estate was in the care of three liquidators, Zeenath Kajee, Bert Surmany, and TP Mudzusi.
Shireen Velayadum, on behalf of the three Rees liquidators, said that the inquiry into the insolvent Rees estate ran for four days, during which time the trustees interrogated 15 witnesses, and the probe closed on 2 July 2018.
In contrast, the Tannenbaum insolvency inquiry ran for 40 days intermittently from April 2010 to November 2011, and more than 200 witnesses gave evidence.
"The inquiry received substantial information including pages that numbered in the thousands," Velayadum said.
"The trustees did not travel to Hong Kong to access Rees’s bank accounts there. We obtained bank statements of known bank accounts for the insolvent,” she said.“The trustees of the Rees estate did not travel outside of South Africa in the course of administration of the estate.”
By contrast, in October 2012, the Tannenbaum trustees organised an R5.5m trip to Australia to extract information from the Ponzi kingpin [nose 244].
SARS criticised this expenditure as mostly fruitless, but the trustees defended it as useful in tracking Tannenbaum’s worldwide assets. They could at least say they had tried.
Before the trip, the three Tannenbaum co-liquidators applied to the Federal Court of Australia in Brisbane to try to include Tannenbaum’s Australian estate in the South African insolvent estate.
On 24 August 2012, Australian Judge Logan ruled that the court should aid the South Gauteng High Court in Johannesburg by making Tannenbaum submit a statement of his affairs to the three trustees.
However, the judge dismissed the application to include Tannenbaum’s Australian estate in the South African insolvent estate and for the South African trustees to administer and realise all of Tannenbaum’s assets in Australia.
A letter addressed to SARS officials in November 2011 by Brooks & Brand Attorneys Inc, known today as Brooks and Braatvedt Inc (B&B), showed that Tannenbaum transferred A$15m (today worth over R150m) to his Bartan bank accounts in Australia between March 11, 2009, and April 17, 2009. A year later the money had gone elsewhere and Bartan was wound up.
In his ruling, Judge Logan put the total amount that Tannenbaum’s scheme received from 2004 to 2009 at R3.3 billion. The three South African trustees estimated the amount at R3.6bn.
SARS found that for the 2004 to 2009 tax years of assessment, nearly R4bn flowed through Tannenbaum’s South African bank accounts. However, these numbers excluded bank accounts Tannenbaum held outside South Africa – in Australia, Hong Kong and possibly elsewhere in the world.
Judge Logan said that by the time the trustees launched their application in Australia, Tannenbaum was no longer “habitually resident in South Africa”, so his Australian estate could not accrue to the South African trustees of his insolvent South African estate.
“That country [South Africa] was once his place of habitual residence, but it is no longer. Neither he nor his family has lived in that country since 2007. (They emigrated to Sydney, Australia in March of that year.) That was well before he was made bankrupt in that jurisdiction.”
|Tannenbaum makes the Australian papers|
“On the whole of the evidence, the conclusion which I reach is that, at the very least, if not already by 2009, he was habitually resident in Australia as at the time this application was filed,” Judge Logan said.
Using this test of residency and other reasons, Logan dismissed the trustees’ application to extend their powers to Tannenbaum’s Australian estate.
In a letter addressed to Tannenbaum in 2010 by SARS, it identified Leigh and Rees as Tannenbaum’s key agents, given the number of people they had signed up to the scheme.
Rees tried to claim R10m in commission he alleged he was owed from the Tannenbaum estate, according to a requisition form dated 15 June 2009.
Given the number of people that they introduced to Tannenbaum’s scheme, SARS initially also identified the following people as “agents”: Jonathan Rosenberg, CEO of Renasa Insurance; Ben Jowitt; Andrew Armstrong, former OK Bazaars CEO; Mervyn Serebro; and Craig Delport, a Cape Town attorney.
In perpetrating the fraud, Tannenbaum conned people into investing in his scheme by saying that his company, Frankel Chemicals, had won a significant tender from Aspen Pharmacare to supply the ingredients for anti-retroviral drugs.
Tannenbaum told people that Frankel was Aspen’s sole and exclusive supplier in this regard. However, Aspen produced an affidavit in 2009, from which it was clear that Tannenbaum forged numerous documents purporting to demonstrate the purchase of ingredients by Aspen and amounts owing by Aspen, trustee Kalianjee said in a note.
The investment period for these loans was eight to 12 weeks. Investors were offered a return of 10% to 30% (equivalent to an annual interest rate of between 65% and 195%).
While the news broke of the scheme’s collapse in June 2009, in retrospect there are indications that things were unravelling several months earlier.
“Problems first arose toward the end of 2008 when repayments from Tannenbaum were not forthcoming, which Tannenbaum initially blamed on the banks,” Judge Boissie Mbha wrote in his judgment of June 2014.
Mbha stated in his judgment that in an email exchange, possibly in 2009, between Rees and Tannenbaum, Tannenbaum said: “Thank God for [two new investors] otherwise the window [to leap from] will look tempting again!”
“It appears Tannenbaum was considering the possibility of suicide,” Mbha wrote.
“The correspondence also confirms growing anxiety of Rees and Tannenbaum from about October 2008, when the global economic recession was biting. Tannenbaum expressed the sentiment; thus, ‘Feels as if the rivers are slowing – know what I mean?’, as the consequent difficulty of soliciting funds from new investors grew. They then joked with one another about committing suicide or being found ‘floating in the lake, face down’,” Mbha wrote.
Rees indicated in a letter dated 23 March 2009 to Leroy Tulip, who had contributed R100,000 to the scheme, that the scheme was in trouble and that payouts were delayed.
“We… have no alternative but to implement an …increase in length of transactions with which you are involved,” Rees told Tulip, adding that Tulip’s payout would take place in May rather than April. However, the scheme then folded, so he was not paid at all.
In court documents from 2014, the three trustees wrote that Rees had emigrated to Switzerland in January 2009 where he continued to operate the scheme with Tannenbaum.
In the Mbha judgment, he says Rees admitted in an affidavit that he had received between R70m and R80m in so-called “commissions”.
“In some of the exchanges he had with Tannenbaum, Rees even referred to investors as “those idiots”, thus displaying his total and callous disregard for investors. Clearly, he never gave a second thought to the immorality of using monies entrusted to him, to bankroll his and his wife’s lavish lifestyle,” the judge said.
“Rees also acquiesced in Tannenbaum’s suggestion that certain information pertaining to the scheme’s offshore funds be withheld from the South African Reserve Bank,” Mbha wrote.
“Rees was struck from the roll of attorneys on 6 October 2001, on the grounds that he was no longer a fit and proper person to continue to practise as an attorney.”
The Law Society of the Northern Provinces filed an affidavit setting out 16 grounds in support of its application. These included maladministration of a trust account, involvement in a Ponzi scheme and document fraud.
“[MD of Computer Forensic Services] Steve Harcourt-Cooke’s report shows that Tannenbaum’s net liabilities increased exponentially from [R8.3m] as at February 2005 to [R311.4m] on 5 June 2009,” Mbha wrote.
A review of Rees’s bank statements prepared by Harcourt-Cookes showed that Rees used more than R170m of funds for himself and his wife.
“This money was spent by Rees on luxurious items such as gold, jewellery, first-class air travel, entertainment, liquor, renovations, and maintenance to his house, salaries to himself and so forth,” Judge Mbha noted.
“During the relevant period, Rees paid R1.29m to Tannenbaum from Centaur – Rees’s property-owning company – and instructed Tannenbaum to repay [R27.8m] into its bank account. Thus, Rees had a return, albeit illegally, of approximately 700% per annum from Tannenbaum,” Mbha wrote.
The first liquidation and distribution account issued in 2014 showed that the trustees had collected just R100.5m for the insolvent estate.
In a notice of motion in 2014, the three trustees state: “To date, the trustees have entered into settlement agreements and obtained judgments against defendants in the aggregate sum of approximately R260m.”
However, it is not clear how much of that R260m was collected.
|Former Dimension Data CEO Jeremy Ord|
People who put large sums of money into the scheme included: former Pick n Pay CEO Sean Summers; former Dimension Data CEO Jeremy Ord; accountant Howard Lowenthal; former JSE chair Norman Lowenthal; and former Bond Exchange CEO Tom Lawless.
The trustees issued the second liquidation and distribution account in late 2016, and the payout to concurrent creditors was R12.7m.
Legal fees for the second liquidation and distribution account amounted to R5.176m, and the fee paid to the trustees was R1.3m.
However, by the time an amended second liquidation and distribution account, dated 15 August 2017, was issued there was a reduction in the award to concurrent creditors to R10.5m. It looks like just over R40m was paid back to creditors of the insolvent estate. The amended account also shows the trustees awarded Standard Bank just over R10m. In the case of all awards, it is not clear what was actually paid out.
Nedbank claimed R43.1m, was awarded R9.1m and was left with a shortfall of R34m.
Among the individual claimants was Christopher Leppan who brought the sequestration application against Tannenbaum’s estate in 2009, submitted a claim, and was awarded R606,066, which was short of his claim by R2.865m.
According to an amended second liquidation and distribution account dated 22 June 2017, below, are some of the claims and amounts awarded:
•Peter Beale was awarded R10.4m after having claimed R49.2m.
•Alan Agienz claimed R2.3m but was awarded R491,007.
•Richard Erling Foyn claimed R5.575m but was awarded R1.179m.
•JE Jowitt claimed R10.07m and was awarded R2.129m.
•Simon Cretney was awarded R9.343m after claiming R44.177m.
B&B was the Johannesburg law firm that got the lion’s share of the legal fees paid out by the trustees of the Tannenbaum estate.
Lawyers received R30.3m, with about R29m going to B&B, according to a document dated 3 February 2016.
Included in the fees paid to B&B was R2.6m for work done in Australia.
The lawyers and accountants that got paid from the proceeds of the insolvent Tannenbaum estate included: B&B; Kramer Villion Norris; DLA Cliffe Dekker, which has become Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr; Werksmans Attorneys; and Horwath Leveton Boner, which has become Crowe.
The trustees came under fire for the extremely high legal fees they paid primarily to B&B.
Elle-Sarah Rossato, a SARS manager, noted in court documents in 2014 that KPMG was involved in the Tannenbaum and Krion insolvent estates and in both cases, legal fees were very high.
The Krion Ponzi scheme operated in the Vaal Triangle between 1998 and 2002 where 14,000 investors lost R1.5bn, according to The Citizen.
“The first liquidation and distribution account in that matter - reflected a free residue in the estate of R103.1m …the legal costs amounted to [almost R74m],” Rossato said of the Krion insolvent estate.
Jeanette Venter, an attorney who specialises in the drafting of bills of costs and the taxation of legal fees, provided the following opinion on behalf of SARS in court papers:
“In my view …the attorney charged more than ten times the prescribed tariff for the work done in this magistrate’s court matter. This seems to me to be excessive.”
Venter is an attorney and member of Jeanette Venter Cost Consultants CC, which specialises in the drafting of bills of costs and the taxation of legal fees. Venter reviewed an invoice from B&B dated 30 September 2013.
“It appears that the fees as charged were nearly three-and-a-half times more than prescribed tariffs. In other words, on the prescribed tariff a surcharge of more than 350% has been applied,” she said.
“In my view, taking the amount of work in this matter into account, it was open for the applicants to have entered into an agreement for a much lower tariff... The trustees could, for instance, have come to some agreement with the attorneys to pay the prescribed tariff for the relevant work, together with, say, a 50% surcharge thereon,” Venter said.
The trustees defended the amounts they had paid in legal fees and justified them for the following reasons:
•The insolvency inquiry ran for 40 days;
•The trustees instituted about 115 court actions;
•Particular court action against Rees, in which the estate obtained a judgment of R160m, ran for 13 court days;
•Substantial and very complicated court action against a debtor settled for R35m, in which the estate employed senior and junior counsel;
•Several consultations with various senior counsel to obtain opinions regarding extremely complex issues;
•The employment of attorneys and counsel in Australia at a substantial cost;
•And the seven-day trip to Australia.
On June 9, 2014, SARS lodged a formal objection with the Master against the first liquidation and distribution account.
SARS objected to the legal fees and called up the Master to direct that the legal fees be taxed, or reviewed, per provisions of Section 73 of the Insolvency Act.
Taxation of legal fees is the process of reviewing a law firm’s costs.
Depending on the nature of an attorney’s bill, the Law Society, the Bar Council or the Taxing Master of the High Court review the legal fees.
In July 2014, the trustees said that the “fees and disbursement… are… not subject to ‘proper taxation’ by the Law Society” – largely because they had struck a deal with B&B and other lawyers they used to allow such a situation.
On 28 August 2014, the Master upheld the objection and directed that the legal costs be taxed. The trustees brought a legal challenge against this.
The three Tannenbaum estate trustees opposed the taxing of the legal fees as follows:
“Our attorney has discussed the estimated costs of taxing …with an independent cost consultant, Mr Willie Wandrag. Mr Wandrag is of the view that it would take approximately two years to prepare and tax the necessary bills of costs …the costs of taxation would be approximately R4m Clearly, these costs are substantial and would prejudice the concurrent creditors.”
On 1 October 2015, Judge C?H Nicholls ruled on the matter. She set aside the Master’s ruling that the legal costs incurred by the trustees in the insolvent Tannenbaum estate, be reviewed in terms of Section 73 of the Insolvency Act.
Nicholls also confirmed the first liquidation and distribution account of the insolvent Tannenbaum estate.
SARS analysed Tannenbaum’s bank accounts and came up with noteworthy results.
Pieter Engelbrecht, a SARS coordinator for financial investigations at the time, said in court papers that the SARS investigation had reviewed 26 local bank accounts used by Tannenbaum.
Of the nearly R4bn that flowed through Tannenbaum’s bank accounts from the 2004 to 2009 tax years of assessment, Investec received deposits of R2.4bn, Rand Merchant Bank got deposits of R1.4bn and the rest of the money went via several other banks, Engelbrecht said.
SARS identified 390 investors in the scheme, per its bank statement analysis, of which SARS was able to match 378 investors to the information contained in the KPMG report, Engelbrecht said.
Trustee Kalianjee, on the other hand, said on 30 October 2009, that an analysis of Tannenbaum’s bank statements indicated that the total investments might amount to nearly 800.
“I have been contacted by creditors from overseas, such as Barwa of Qatar, Concordia of the British Virgin Islands, and Meyer Levin of the United States of America,” Kalianjee added.
The Concordia API Fund claimed $7.787m (or R60.4m) at a rate of 7.76 to the US dollar as of 27 July 2009.
Engelbrecht provided an analysis of how the money flowed into Tannenbaum’s bank accounts.
In 2004, the money started as a trickle in the millions, but by 2009 it was a flood in the billions before the whole scheme came unstuck.
Here is how the money flowed into Tannenbaum’s accounts: 2004 (R6.577m), 2005 (R22.735m), 2006 (R103.363m), 2007 (R297.448m), 2008 (R1.2368bn), and 2009 (R1.49bn).
When the first liquidation and distribution account was issued, claimant John Martin objected in a letter to the trustees to the fact that Leigh had only paid a net of R5.3m into the insolvent estate.
“I am concerned that this does not represent Leigh’s total assets,” Martin said.
In a letter dated 10 July 2014, written by Galloway on behalf of the joint trustees, and addressed to the Master of the South Gauteng High Court, said that Leigh’s profit from the scheme amounted to R114.2m.
A KPMG document dated 31 January 2014, shows that the Tannenbaum estate sold several Leigh assets. Boats and jetskis sold for R473,100 (all figures are gross sales before costs); a Lamborghini for R1.402m; the “Wedge property”, which was owned 50:50 with Tannenbaum, sold for R1.875m; and a Morningside, Johannesburg, property sold for R3m.
In 2009 Noseweek reported that Leigh had two Lamborghinis. However, it would appear the trustees sold only one of them to recoup money for the insolvent estate.
The KPMG document noted that the trustees had sold a Vespa for R28,500 as settlement related to a person referred to as “Muller”; another person called “Miller” settled for an amount of R217,303, which was raised by the sale of a property in the Caribbean, in terms of a settlement agreement with John Miller.
The KPMG document noted that the trustees had sold a property owned by a person called “Rossen” and a settlement of R2.4m received.
The first liquidation and distribution account was made available as of 23 May 2014, and it shows that many people who contributed to the scheme settled with the trustees, as there are 14 pages of settlements where people paid their profits into the insolvent Tannenbaum estate.
In court documents of 2014, the trustees outlined the challenges they faced in unravelling the Tannenbaum scheme.
“There were no genuine records available to document the conduct of the scheme. Those that were available were false,” they added. “The trustees were completely in the dark in regard to the nature, extent and complexity of the scheme,” the trustees said.
“Given the dearth of information available to us, we were unable to administer the estate without enlisting the services of experienced attorneys and forensic accountants to assist us. The task that lay before us in unravelling and reconstructing the scheme and Tannenbaum’s affairs over five years on a worldwide scale was monumental,” they added.
The trustees, attorneys, and forensic accountants were able to piece together the scheme and Tannenbaum’s affairs by using witness evidence, documents and bank statements.
“To illustrate the extent and complexity of this exercise, the final spreadsheet reflecting the flow of money through the Tannenbaum bank accounts, including these transactions with investors, comprised approximately 24,000 line items. Each line item required analysis and investigation,” the trustees said.
“The documentation that we acquired during the inquiry process… totalled approximately 75,000 pages,” they said. “In addition, the forensic reports… were contained in 25 lever-arch files (approximately 12,000 pages),” the trustees added.
• As Noseweek, went to press we received the following statement from an NPA spokesperson: “Please note that the investigations into the matter are not yet finalised, amongst others, we are waiting for a forensic audit report from Deloitte. Upon receiving such a report, the NPA will be in a position to make an informed decision on whether or not criminal proceedings should be instituted.”
• Asked to comment on the forensic work it was commissioned to do by the NPA, Deloitte South Africa spokesperson Yolisa Tyantsi responded: “Deloitte is not able to comment due to its client confidentiality obligations. Inquiries on the matter should be referred to the client.”
Tyantsi didn’t answer questions about the nature of the forensic work and when the NPA commissioned it. She declined to say when Deloitte was likely to complete the job and produce a final forensic report.
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